A few recent articles in Global War Studies:
James P. Levy, ‘The Development of British Naval Aviation: Preparing the Fleet Air Arm for War, 1934‒1939′
The British military (both Royal Navy and Royal Air Force) have been criticized for a perceived failure to “embrace” the aircraft carrier and naval air power in the two decades between Versailles and Hitler’s invasion of Poland. This criticism is particularly acute within the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) paradigm. Such criticism is overdrawn. This article will demonstrate that the British were fully aware of the importance of carrier air power, but bureaucratic, budgetary, and industrial constraints limited the scope of its development. If RMAs do occur, they may be, like political revolutions, varied in their nature, scope, and outcome. The development of British naval air capabilities (at least carrier-based ones) can be seen in a broader context as akin to Anglo-American political revolutions: it preserved as much as it replaced. This article contends that the Royal Navy worked their carrier forces into an existing battlefleet concept using the forces then at hand. The conclusion drawn from the evidence of the time is that no other practical course was available given the realities of rushed, forced rearmament in the late 1930s.
Louis A. DiMarco, ‘The American Mechanized Cavalry’s Critical Contribution to Allied Victory in Europe, 1944‒1945
The U.S. Army’s mechanized cavalry forces in World War II proved to be an effective blend of diverse combat capabilities and absolutely necessary for the success of American ground forces in the northwest Europe campaign. The mechanized cavalry forces, a total of twenty-seven separate squadrons organized into thirteen cavalry groups, uniquely possessed a blend of mobility, firepower, communications, and dismounted combat ability that was essential to the operational success of American field armies and corps. Mobility, combined with firepower and communications, enabled opera- tional commanders to cover large expanses of terrain with an economy of force. The economy of force ability of the cavalry, and its ability to dismount and fight as infantry, were critical to mitigating the Army’s crippling shortage of infantry units and replacements as the campaign progressed. Cavalry units, primarily the corps cavalry groups, permitted commanders to concentrate infantry at critical points, still have a continuous front, and continue offensive operations. The combat capabilities of mechanized cavalry mitigated the risk caused by the lack of density and depth in the cavalry portions of the front. The ability of mechanized cavalry leaders to order “Dismount!” to conduct operations on the ground was one of the important capabilities that enabled Eisenhower’s broad-front strategy and was crucial to the success of the American Army in the European Theater.
James V. Koch, ‘Shattered Myths: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, July 1943’
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Global War Studies is the leading international peer-reviewed journal dedicated to the study of the Second World War, 1919-1945. Published three times annually, GWS provides a scholarly forum for exploring a broad range of topics, including military, air power, naval, intelligence, and diplomatic history. Additionally, the journal publishes research articles on weapons technology, geopolitics, home front studies, the Holocaust, resistance movements, and peacekeeping operations.
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